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Abstract
The  way  a  rational  agent  changes  her  belief  in  certain 
proposition/hypotheses  in  the  light  of  new evidence lies  in  the heart  of 
Bayesian inference.  The basic natural assumption, as summarized in van 
Fraassen’s  Reflection Principle  (1984),  would be that  in the  absence of 
new evidence the belief should not change. Yet, there are examples that are 
claimed to  violate  this  assumption.  The  apparent  paradox  presented  by 
such  examples,  if  not  settled,  would  demonstrate  inconsistency  and/or 
incompleteness  of  the  Bayesian  approach  and  without  eliminating  this 
inconsistency the approach cannot be regarded as scientific. 
The  Sleeping  Beauty  Problem  is  just  such  an  example.  The 
existing attempts to solve the problem fall into three categories. The first 
two  share  a  view  that  the  new  evidence  is  absent,  but  differ  in  the 
conclusion of whether Sleeping Beauty should change her belief or not and 
why.  The third category is characterized by a view that, after all, a new 
evidence (although hidden from the initial view) is available.
My solution is radically different and does not fall into either of 
these categories.  I  deflate the paradox by arguing that the two different 
degrees  of  belief  presented  in  the  Sleeping  Beauty Problem are  in  fact 
beliefs  in two different  propositions,  i.e.  there is no need to explain the 
(un)change of belief.  
   
The  Sleeping  Beauty  Problem is  a  paradox  in  probability  theory  that  has 
recently received much attention in the literature (see references). Sleeping Beauty 
(SB) undergoes the following experiment (the setup of which is known to her). She is 
going to sleep on Sunday evening. Then an experimentalist tosses a fair (50:50) coin. 
If the result is Heads, she is woken on Monday only. If the result  is Tails, SB is 
woken twice, on Monday and on Tuesday. In addition, she is given a special drug that 
causes her to forget whether she was woken on the day before or not. Thus, when she 
is  woken she does not know whether  it  is  Monday or Tuesday.  Each time she is 
woken she is asked to give her credence the coin landed Heads. The ‘problem’ is that 
two following answers seem to be both valid1: 
(a) On  the  one  hand,  on  Sunday  SB  believed  that  the  coin  is  fair  and  the 
probability that it will land Heads is ½. The fact that SB has been woken does 
not give her any new relevant information, because she knew all along that she 
is supposed to be woken at least once anyway. Thus, her credence ought to 
stay the same as on Sunday, i.e. 1/2.     
1 There are several versions of the problem and a few variations of how the experiment is conducted. 
These variations are, however, not crucial for the argument of the present article.
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(b) On the other hand, on a long series of trials the number of times she will be 
woken after the coin landed Tails is twice the number of times SB will be 
woken after the coin landed Heads. Thus, her answer should be 1/3.   
Two remarks should be made about these answers. First, the question posed to 
SB is a question about her credence upon awakening. This is not a question about the 
nature of the coin. Thus, any change of SB’s credence (if any) must not be interpreted 
as a change of her opinion about the nature of the coin, rather should be rationally 
justified basing on the laws of Bayesian inference. Second, plausibility of the answer 
(b)  can  be  made  more  profound.  There  is  no  qualitative  difference  between  the 
original formulation of SB problem and its following modification. Suppose that SB 
is put to sleep on New Year’s Eve. At 12pm the Champaign is opened and the fair 
coin is tossed. Subsequently, if it lands Tails SB is woken on every single day during 
the  year,  i.e.  365 times,  if  the  coin  lands  Heads  she  is  woken only once  on  one 
(arbitrary)  day during the year.   In this experiment,  therefore, SB’s choice will be 
between ½ and 1/366. One would find much harder to argue in favour of ½ in this 
case. With an appropriate modification of the experiment the second number can take 
any rational value. It will be especially difficult to maintain the answer of ½ in the 
limit of that number going to zero. 
How can the problem be resolved?  The existing approaches in the literature 
are characterized by a common assumption (explicit or implicit) that the reasoning (a) 
is in logical contradiction with the reasoning (b). Therefore, the usual efforts to solve 
the problem focus on demonstrating that, despite the apparent correctness of both (a) 
and  (b),  one  of  them  is  false  (Weintraub  2004).   And  there  is  a  good  deal  of 
controversy amongst  the  philosophers  about  which  one!   “Thirders”  are  trying  to 
provide various explanations why SB is ought to change her belief from ½ on Sunday 
to 1/3 on awakening. “Halfers”, on the contrary, are trying to justify why her belief is 
ought to stay the same, i.e. ½.  
My approach is completely different. I question the very basic assumption that 
(a) contradicts (b) and deflate the problem by arguing that this contradiction is merely 
apparent. In other words, I show that there is no contradiction between SB’s belief 
that the coin is fair, i.e. upon tossing on Sunday the probability of the coin to land 
Heads is equal ½, and her credence of 1/3 upon awakening that the result of coin 
tossing was Heads. Thus, on the one hand, I agree with “thirders” that her credence on 
awakening should be 1/3, but on the other hand, I show that there is no need for SB to 
change her belief. One belief does not contradict the other.
Moreover,  this  contradiction  can  be  dissolved  solely  in  the  framework  of 
standard probability theory. I show that no additional arguments going beyond basic 
probability theory, such as appeals to the relevancy of rational agent’s ‘own temporal 
location’ (Elga 2000: 145) or the difference between knowing all along that Beauty 
will be woken and knowing that she is woken now (Weintraub 2004), are needed. 
I  will  argue, that  both (a) and (b) are correct answers but to two  different  
questions. SB is asked to give the credence, i.e. the degree of belief,  in particular 
value of physical or epistemic probability, of certain event. However the phrase “the 
coin landed Heads” alone does not define that event completely. As I will discuss in 
detail in the course of the article, an experimental setup is necessary to describe an 
event.  In the question posed to SB we implicitly assume that setup.  This setup is 
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wakening  (and  interviewing)2.  Thus,  the  question  posed  to  her  is  ‘What  is  your 
credence the coin landed Heads under setup of wakening?’ It can be rephrased as 
‘What  is  your  credence  that  this  awakening is  a  Head-awakening  under  setup  of 
wakening?’ And the correct answer should be (b). However, “the coin landed Heads” 
with a different setup will form a different event. In particular, “the coin landed Heads 
under setup of coin tossing”. If we asked SB ‘What is your credence that the coin 
landed Heads under setup of coin tossing?’, then the correct answer would be (a) [SB 
still believes that the coin is fair]. From the first look these two questions might seem 
similar,  especially  because  there  is  one-to-one logical  cause-effect  correspondence 
between  them,  nevertheless  they  are  not.  Subsequently,  the  corresponding 
probabilities are different as well. Thus, the source of the problem is that, although, 
the former question is the one that is posed to SB, one tends to confuse it with the 
latter question, thereby arriving at a paradox. 
The aim of the rest of the article is to justify the argument presented in the 
preceding paragraph, and, in particular, to provide detail explanation of why those 
two questions are different and why the two events associated with them are different 
as well.
The following notation will be used below:
P(A)      – the probability of an event A,
P(A/B)  – the conditional probability of an event A given that an event B has 
                occurred.
Trial   – a single run of the complete experiment starting with the act of coin tossing
                and ending with one or two awakenings.
In order to emphasize the objective mathematical character of this illusion and 
eliminate  every  possible  psychological/subjective  aspect  often  surrounding  this 
paradox, I will present it with the following inanimate version of the problem. Let me 
replace the coin, the experimentalist and SB by the following automatic setting: an 
automatic device tosses a fair coin, if coin lands ‘Tails’ the device puts two red balls 
in a box, if the coin lands ‘Heads’ it puts one green ball in the box. The device repeats 
this procedure a large number of times N. As a result the box will be full of balls of 
both colours.
The device’s task now is to determine the probability that if it picks up a ball 
from the box at random, this ball will be a green ball. The device may calculate this 
probability  theoretically  using  the  relative  frequency definition  of  probability3.  At 
large N the probability of picking up a green ball, P(green←box), is numerically very 
close to a ratio of the number of green balls to the total number of balls in the box:
                                P(green←box)≈N(green)/N(green+red).                                   (1) 
2 Note that including a setup in the definition of an event is different from the conditioning of credence 
of the event on evidence. SB does not receive any new evidence upon wakening, yet the credences are 
not the same, because the setups, and therefore the events, are different. 
3 Note that here as well as in the original statement of the paradox, as formulated by Elga (2000), the 
frequentist definition of probability is used in (b).  In subsequent discussions, though, various authors 
based  their  arguments  mainly on  the  application  of  the  principle  of  indifference  and  on  Bas  van 
Fraassen’s reflection principle, rather than on frequentist definition of probability. In this article I use 
the frequentist definition simply because it does the job perfectly. Moreover, the way I dissolve the 
problem implies that application of Bayesian methods will not lead to any contradictions as well.
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Because the coin is fair then on the long run it will land ‘Heads’ approximately N/2 
times. Therefore, the number of green balls in the box will be half of the total number 
of  trials,  N(green)=N/2.  Similarly,  N(red)=N.  Thus,  N(green+red)=3N/2,  and  we 
obtain
                                                   P(green←box)=1/3.                                                 (2)
The device may, of course, verify this result experimentally simply by counting the 
numbers of balls in the box. 
On the other hand, since the event ‘Coin landed Heads’, P(H), is necessarily 
followed by the event ‘A (one) green ball being put in the box’ (green→box) there is 
one to one correspondence between these two events, i.e.
P(green→box)=P(green→box /H) P(H)
                                                         =P(H/green→box)P(green→box)= P(H),        (3)
according to Bayes'  rule. Now we have arrived at a critical point. The core of the 
whole confusion is that we tend to regard ‘A (one) green ball being put in the box’ 
and ‘A green ball  being  picked out from the box’ as equivalent.  Subsequently we 
combine (2) and (3), thereby (mistakenly) concluding that the probability of ‘Coin 
landed Heads’ is 1/3. But, of course, it is not!
The reason is that the event ‘A green ball being put in the box’ and the event 
‘A green ball being picked out from the box’ are two different events, and therefore 
their  probabilities  are not necessary equal.  These two events are different because 
they are subject to different experimental setups: one is the coin tossing, another is the 
picking up a ball from the full box at random4. The probability to put a green ball in 
the box on each coin tossing trial is ½, however the probability to pick out a green 
ball from the full box at the end is 1/3! This might seem paradoxical, but there is no 
contradiction. 
So, how from the first ½ do we get that only 1/3 of all balls in the box are 
green, and therefore 1/3 for the probability to pick out a green one? Although the 
probability of a green ball being put in the box in each trial is ½, the average number 
of green balls which the device puts in the box on each trial is 1/3. That is why at the 
end the number of green balls in the box is half the number of red ones. Let me show 
this calculation in detail.
The total average number of balls which the device puts in the box on one trial 
is:
Nav[green+red→box]= P(H)∙1+ P(T)∙2=3/2.
Here I take into account the fact that if the coin lands Tails then two red balls go into 
the box. Therefore,
Nav[green→box]= P(H)∙1/ Nav[green+red→box]=1/3.
4 This emphasises  the fact  that  an experimental  setup or condition  of an event  is  essential  for  its 
(event’s) definition (Shaposhnikov, 1987). Even two similarly-looking events are different if they are 
subjects to different conditions. Thus, we should define two above events more precisely as ‘A green 
ball being picked out from the box under the setup that the device picks out this ball from the full box’ 
and ‘A green ball being put in the box under the setup  that the device tosses a fair coin’.
4
Hopefully, now anyone is convinced that there is nothing wrong in believing in both 
propositions:  the probability of a green ball being put in the box equals 1/2 and the 
probability of a green ball being picked out from the box equals 1/3. The case of SB 
should be no different.
Indeed,  in  a direct  analogy with the experiment  described above,  the SB’s 
‘Head/Tail’-awakenings are just like those green/red balls. On the long run of N coin 
tossing trials there will be twice as much Tail-awakenings ‘in the box’ than Head-
awakenings. Beauty is woken – one awakening is ‘being picked out from the box’. 
The probability that ‘This awakening is a Head-awakening under setup of wakening’ 
is  1/3.  However,  although a  Head-awakening  is  necessarily  preceded by the  coin 
landed Heads, the probability of ‘The coin landed Heads under setup of coin tossing’ 
is ½, i.e. on each coin tossing the probability that one Head-awakening will be ‘added 
to the box’ is ½. Yet, the average number of Head-awakenings ‘added to the box’ on 
each coin tossing trial is 1/3. Thus everything is consistent. And the answer depends 
on what precisely do we mean by the question. If we mean ‘This awakening is a 
Head-awakening under setup of wakening’, then her answer should be 1/3, but if we 
mean ‘The coin landed Heads under setup of coin tossing’, her answer should be 1/2. 
After all these explanations you might still wonder why the original question 
is so ambiguous. The two setups are very different from each other. So, why do we 
tend to confuse them if they are not mentioned in the question explicitly? One tends to 
assign the probability of 1/3 to the event ‘The coin landed Heads’ if she/he assumes 
‘The coin landed Heads  under setup of wakening’ instead of ‘under setup of coin  
tossing’.  But  what  sense  does  it  make  to  define  such  an  event?  As  the  Head-
awakening is necessary preceded by the coin landed Heads, the above formulation is 
equivalent to ‘This awakening is a Head-awakening  under setup of wakening’. The 
interpretation of the latter  is clear and was given in the preceding paragraph.  The 
interpretation of the former version might be the following. To say that the awakening 
is a Head-awakening is to say that the last time the coin was tossed it had landed 
Heads,  and the experimenter  recorded this  result  (say by writing it  on a  piece of 
paper). To ask Beauty to give the probability of ‘The coin landed Heads under setup 
of wakening’ means to ask her to give the probability of finding Heads written now on 
that piece of paper.
The  answer  1/3  is  often  justified  by  an  appeal  to  the  betting  approach  to 
probability [though there is no consensus on the applicability of the betting approach 
to SB problem (Bradley and Leitgeb, 2006)]. There is, obviously, no contradiction 
between the argument of this article and the betting approach , which corresponds to 
the setup of awakening. Indeed, the number of times Beauty gives a right answer 
relative to the number of times  she is asked (to bet) this is what counts here. The 
number of times SB is asked equals the number of times she is awaked. This is clearly 
the setup of awakening. (The drug makes each of these questioning independent of the 
others.)
And finally, from the argument I have presented here we can learn a lesson 
about the interpretation of the nature of the coin in the framework of SB Problem. On 
Sunday  SB  beliefs  that  the  coin  is  fair.  What  does  it  mean?  If  SB  favours  the 
frequentist approach she would say that on a long sequence of independent trials the 
coin will land Heads half of the times – the relative frequencies of Heads and Tails are 
equal.  If  she  is  a  Bayesian  then  she  would  say  that  both  sides  of  the  coin  are 
equivalent (i.e. there is no evidence that favours one over the other) and according to 
the  principle  of  indifference she  assigns  equal  epistemic  probabilities  to  each 
outcome. So far this is well as it goes, because SB is under setup of coin tossing. But 
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what happens under setup of wakening? Does the credence of 1/3 imply that SB stops 
believing in fairness of the coin? No.  Our interpretation of the nature of the coin is 
sensitive to the setup as well! The fairness of the coin does not imply that we have to 
assign equal credences and vice versa. We do, indeed,  under setup of coin tossing,  
but we do not  under setup of wakening. If you wish, the fair coin is a coin to which 
SB ought to assign credence of 1/3 for Heads  under setup of wakening  in the SB 
experiment!
To summarize:
The concept of an  event is central and crucial in Probability Theory.  The Sleeping 
Beauty Problem arises due to improper use of a notion of an event. The setup under 
which the event takes place must be always taken into account. If we do so, then we 
realize that the original question posed to SB can be interpreted in two different ways. 
First interpretation is ‘What is your credence that the coin landed Heads under setup 
of  coin  tossing?’,  and  the  answer  should  be  ½.  Second  interpretation  is  ‘This 
awakening is a Head-awakening under setup of wakening’, and the answer should be 
1/3.  And there is no paradox!
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